Criticism of the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism

The claim that autistic individuals lack Theory of Mind (ToM)—the ability to understand that others have thoughts, emotions, and perspectives different from their own—has long been a central principle in psychology. However, this assumption is increasingly challenged by empirical evidence that fails to support its validity.

The Myth of ToM Deficit in Autism

Gernsbacher and Yergeau (2019) provide a comprehensive critique of the claim that autistic individuals are uniquely impaired in ToM. Their review highlights multiple empirical failures of this assertion, demonstrating that:

• Autistic individuals do not universally struggle with ToM tasks.

• Many original studies that supported the ToM deficit hypothesis have failed to replicate.

• Various ToM tasks do not consistently relate to each other or account for social interaction, empathy, and autistic traits.

• Data from researchers outside the ToM framework fail to support the assumptions made by those within it.

Ultimately, Gernsbacher and Yergeau conclude that the claim that autistic individuals lack ToM is not only empirically questionable but also societally harmful.

Lack of Specificity: Not Unique to Autism

The assumption that only autistic individuals struggle with ToM tasks is demonstrably false. Numerous other groups also perform poorly on ToM-related assessments, including children with:

• Specific language impairments (Norbury 2005; Loukusa et al. 2014)

• Down syndrome (Zelazo et al. 1996)

• Williams syndrome (van Herwegen et al. 2013)

• Prader-Willi syndrome (Lo et al. 2013)

• Cerebral palsy (Dahlgren et al. 2003; Caillies et al. 2012)

• Fragile X syndrome (Cornish et al. 2005)

• Epilepsy (Raud et al. 2015)

• Neurofibromatosis type I (Payne et al. 2016)

• Prenatal exposure to maternal smoking (Reidy et al. 2013) and drinking (Rasmussen et al. 2009)

Additionally, even typically developing children are more likely to fail False Belief tasks if they:

• Have fewer siblings (Jenkins & Astington 1996; Peterson 2000)

• Come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Hughes & Ensor 2005)

• Have fewer adult relatives living nearby (Minter et al. 1998; Lewis et al. 1996)

• Are blind (Green et al. 2004; Brambring & Asbrock 2010)

• Are deaf or hard of hearing (Peterson & Siegel 1995; Moeller & Schick 2006)

Despite Baron-Cohen (2009; 2010) acknowledging that ToM deficits may not be autism-specific, the erroneous claim persists in psychological literature, sometimes reducing autistic individuals to a category shared with robots and chimpanzees (Pinker 2002).

Lack of Universality: Not All Autistic Individuals Struggle with ToM

If a lack of ToM were a universal trait of autism, then all autistic individuals would fail ToM tasks. However, many pass them, contradicting the notion of ToM deficit as a defining characteristic of autism (Ozonoff et al. 1991; Boucher 2012).

The variability in performance is likely due to the heavy reliance of ToM tasks on spoken language (Gernsbacher & Pripas-Kapit 2012). Since autism is associated with communication differences, it is unsurprising that individuals with more pronounced communication difficulties perform worse on these tasks. Moreover, ToM performance varies among autistic individuals, further undermining the claim of universal impairment.

The ‘Arms Race’ of Theory of Mind Tests

The persistence of the ToM deficit hypothesis has led to an ever-growing arsenal of tests designed to detect this supposed impairment. When existing measures fail to support the claim, new, increasingly complex assessments are introduced. This pattern resembles a methodological ‘arms race,’ escalating from:

• First-order False Belief tasks

• Second-order False Belief tasks

• Advanced ToM tasks (e.g., Strange Stories, Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes, Animated Triangles)

• Specialised tests such as the Strange Stories Film task (Murray et al. 2017), the Comic Strip task (Sivaratnam et al. 2012), and the Beauty Contest task (Pantelis & Kennedy 2017)

Most recently, implicit ToM tasks have been developed (Schneider et al. 2013; Senju et al. 2009). However, difficulties in replicating these findings (Schuwerk et al. 2018; Kulke et al. 2018) raise further doubts about their validity. Rajendran and Mitchell (2007) criticise this approach as reversing scientific logic: instead of questioning the ToM deficit hypothesis when data do not support it, researchers assume the tests are flawed and design ever more sensitive assessments to ‘prove’ the claim.

The Influence of ToM Deficit Theory Beyond Psychology

Despite its numerous empirical failures, the ToM deficit claim remains pervasive not only in psychology but also in:

• Philosophy (Barnbaum 2008)

• Sociology (Willey et al. 2015)

• Economics (Singer & Fehr 2005)

• Anthropology (Boyer 2000)

• Robotics (Scassellati 2002)

• Narratology (Barnes 2012; Zunshine 2008)

• Popular culture

• Informational websites and autism organisations

The claim that autistic individuals lack Theory of Mind is fraught with empirical inconsistencies. It lacks specificity (as many non-autistic individuals struggle with ToM tasks), universality (as many autistic individuals pass ToM tasks), and replicability (as studies often yield contradictory results).

Rather than clinging to a flawed and stigmatising theory, researchers should focus on understanding the diverse cognitive profiles of autistic individuals (as ASD is a group of heterogeneous disorders/conditions) and developing assessments that account for communication differences.